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PREFACE
Without conceding or minimizing the importance of the
specified points set forth in the argument in their prior
Brief,

plaintiffs Baxter feel that a Reply Brief is both

necessary and helpful in addressing certain new matters which
have arisen since their prior Brief was prepared and filed
and to summarize the posture of this litigation for the purpose of condensing the basic issues to be decided on this
Appeal.

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT UDOT SEEKS TO CIRCUMVENT THE BASIC ISSUE IN
THIS CASE AND ITS BURDEN OF PROOF IN RESPECT THERETO.
Both during the trial ot this matter and in its Brief
submitted in support of its position on appeal, defendant Utah
Department of Transportation has limited its presentation of
factual matters and applicable law to the narrow issue of
establishing the location of the "main channel11 of the Weber
River as it existed in 1866. Its argument proceeds with a
contention that when the counties were created in 1866 an
"exact location of the Weber River" could not be determined
-1-

and, accordingly, there was no "legal11 description of the boundary between Davis and Weber Counties until the course of the
Weber River was surveyed in 1894. Based on the foregoing, UDOT
claims that it should prevail.
On page 14 of UDOTfs Brief, excerpted testimony of its
expert witnesses reveal questions by its counsel designed to
elicit responses limited to (a) an "opinion" that he was uncertain
as to which of three different river channels existing at times
between 1855 and 1886 might have been the "main channel" of the
river, and (b) that there was no "legal" description

of the course

of the Weber River in the subject area when the respective counties
were created on January 10,1866.
UD0T!s expert witnesses were restricting their version of a
"legal" description to refer to a metes-and-bounds description,
since the legislature of the Territory of Utah marked the dividing line between the two counties as being "the centre of the
channel of the Weber River due north from the northwest corner of
Kingston1s Fort"-- a very adequate legal description. However,
the same witnesses, together with plaintiff Ronald L. Baxter, all
testified &s set forth on pages 20 through 22 of plaintiffs1 prior
Brief) that, during the course of three official U.S. government
surveys in 1855, 1871 and 1886, the entire flow of the Weber River
in each year was located north of the subject property and, further,
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Weber River then had one, two or three channels, or which of
two or more channels might have then been the

f,

main channel11

of the River, presents an "issue" of no consequence.
It is obvious that, after official U.S. government surveys
in 1855, 1871 and 1886 all located the
of the

Weber River to the north

subject property, the sudden appearance sometime after

1886 of a well-defined single channel on the south side of the
subject property carrying all of the riverfs water, supports the
testimony of Earl Kendell that an up-stream diversion dike, constructed about 1890, diverted the river in a southwesterly direct. 1
ion.
UDOT suggests in its Brief (p.20) that the rock wall diversion
structure was built when highway-construction work was undertaken
(in 1927), presumably by the State Road Commission, but that argument-- now surfacing for the first time-- is based upon a claimed
interpretation °f the 1927 highway plans by its witness DeMass.
(See Exh. D-25 or Exh. P-18—both are the same)
The 1927 highway construction certainly intersected the old
rock wall at its northeast extremity so as to permit realignment
of the prior highway which existed in the general area, and which
curved around a bend of the river in a northerly direction. In the
#

Mr. Kendell related the information as given to him by his grandfather, admissible evidence under Rule 803 (20) and (24), Utah
Rules of Evidence.

-4-

process, the 1927 plans called for a channel change some
distance to the east of the existing rock wall, which was
shown on the highway-design map as a then-existing structure,
so as to straighten and

replace the older road. But there is

no other channel change shown except fur the short distance
indicated on the plans; further, if the rock wall was not in
existence prior to the 1927 construction, the 1927 plans, under
the "List of Structures," certainly would have detailed its
width and length, and the size of the rocks to be used, for
bidding purposes, as well as indicating its association with a
channel change.
Counsel for UDOT claims the rock wall was built to prevent
erosion of the "new highway" constructed in 1927, but the first
full paragraph on page 20 of UD0Tfs Brief is absolutely wrong-as counsel should know! A careful reading of the testimony of
DeMass 1

direct examination (R. 786-767) gives no support for

that claim since he stated that the 1927 plans only involved
-,1 «ew alignment and a reconstruction of an older existing road
at that point:
Q. (By Mr. Ward) And what's the purpose of these proposed
plans on D25, if you know?
A,

Well, it's an alignment and a reconstruction of a
portion of that particular roadway in that area.
(R. 766)

-5-

As to the purpose served by the rock wall, Mr. DaMass
admitted that it was a dike designed to control the direction
of the riverfs flow:
A.

(DeMass) Well, and again you're getting-- a dam and a
dike are two different animals. A dam is to,in fact,
dam or block the water, which would run as previously
testified, perpendicular to the stream to back it up.
A diking situation, a dike would control the water as
far as direction goes.

Q.

(lir. Ward) Itfs then your opinion this rock wall was
constructed for the purpose of preventing erosion to
the highway?

A.

I would think so. It!s exactly in the area where it
should be.
(Underlining added)
(R.767-768)

However, on cross-examination of DeMass it was made clear
that the 1927 highway work simply modified an older road problem
area and that the rock wall diversion facility was in existence
long before 1927-- exactly as Mr. Kendell testified from his
knowledge and the information related to him by his grandfather:
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. FULLER:
Q.

A.

Are you suggesting, Mr. DeMass, that the rock wall shown
on Exhibit 25 might have been built as part of a highway project years ago?
I don't know who built the wall. The wall was in place
. when these plans were developed.
-6-

Q.

i see. So that when these plans were developed, the
rock wall was there, and the irrigation ditch was
taken out of the rock wall, apparently?

A.

Apparently, from what the plans are, thatfs exactly
correct.

0.

And as you read these plans, there was-- at the time
the plans were being built in contemplation of a
channel change, there was a road around the north
side?

A.

Thatfs correct.

Q.

And have you any idea how old that road would have
been?

A.

No, I donft. That road has been there forever.

Q.

But it was there in 19, what, f27?

A. Yes.
Q.

Would it be a logical assumption that when the road
was built and it had a bow in it, then it was
intending to go around to the north of the existing
rock wall and the location of the river as it then
existed?

A,

Yes.

Q.

So whenever that road was built years ago, it had
to go around that area, didn't it?

A.

Right. In that particular area, you1re very narrow
as far as the topography goes. You got the railroad, you got a highway and you got the river and
no room. So all three of them are jammed together
in that particular area.
(Underlining added)
(R. 768-769)
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Shifting to UDOTfs necessity-for-a- survey defense, its
position is summarized in an excerpt taken from Mr. Wardfs
argument at the conclusion of the trial:
Itfs our position at this point, Your Honor, that those
counties consisted of what the 1894 survey said they
consisted of. And so when you consider that along with the
1894 survey, at the time of statehood, they adopted the
counties as they now existed and were surveyed. There
has been absolutely no testimony present, Your Honor,
that would show a survey prior to 1894 of the Weber River
itself.
(Underlining added)
(R. 784)
There is no law which mandates that all established county
boundaries must be surveyed-- and the Utah cases cited in
plaintiffs1 prior Brief recognize the existence of many county
boundary lines tied to natural or artificial objects, such as
rivers, roads, mountain divides and railroads.
It is unfortunate that Judge Hyde chose to adopt the view
that there could be no boundary between the two counties until
the river had been surveyed, since intervening property rights
could thereby have been destroyed in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (since the survey, if
recognized in 1894 by the respective counties, would have been
subject to federal law by virtue of the Organic Act which
established the Territory of Utah) or the Fourteenth Amend-
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ment to the U. S. Constitution-- and the Federal civil
Rights Act tied thereto

(42 U.S.C. # 1983)-- if such rights,

as plaintiffs now have, are presently being destroyed by the
Utah court system and the actions of the State of Utah through
its agencies, its subdivisions, and elected and/or appointed
officials.
And how would UDOT adapt its

"position11 if,

in this or

any other similar situation, no survey of the river had taken
place until 1920, or 1960, or not at all?
The fact that the Weber River was flowing in a new
channel in 1894, and that a metes-and-bounds description was
made at that time showing the location of the then channel of
the river, is completely subordinate to the basic issue of the
relative locations of the Weber River and the subject property
as of January 10, 1866.
UDOT devotes a single page in its Brief (p. 18) "admitting11 that it was charged with the fl. . .burden of proving the
location of the property in question...11 in 1866, as mandated
by Judge Roth and as supported by legal authorities and case
law, but it advances the defense that it had "apparently11 met
its burden of proof since the lower Court ruled that the exact
location of the Weber River in 1866 could not be determined.
The novel argument is patently absurd on its face since it
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would not require UDOT to prove anything and, as UDOT would
view

the situation, it could prevail by presumably creating an

uncertainty on a side issue which was and is entirely beyond
the basic issue of this litigation. Taken literally, the argument raised in its Brief would actually place the burden of
proof on plaintiffs to prove the location of the subject property
with respect to the location of the Weber River in 1866 and
UDOT could adroitly tiptoe around Judge Rothfs ruling.
The irony of this litigation lies in the fact that UDOT,
while acknowledging that it had the burden of proof, made no
attempt to meet its burden; on the other hand, plaintiffs who were
not required to carry the burden of proof, introduced and elicited
evidence at trial clearly

establishing facts necessary to estab-

lish their version of the basic issue in this litigation and to
rebut any relevant "evidence11 which UDOT might have advanced.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS DENIED ACCESS TO OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT SURVEY MAPS WHICH FURNISHED ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE THAT THE
WEBER RIVER WAS LOCATED NORTH OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN

1866.

Included in plaintiffs1 prior Brief are reproductions of
official U.S. government plat maps made at the time ofJand in
conjunction with, the 1855, 1871 and 1886 U.S. government survey
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notes— Exhibits D-14, D-15 and D-16. Juxtaposed on each
of the enlarged Exhibits in plaintiffs1 Brief is the
location of the subject property, placed according to scale.
The Exhibits all clearly show that in every year when the
government surveys were taken the entire Weber River flow was
on the north side of the subject property, placing it in Davis
County as of 1866.
Realizing the importance of the Exhibits, both standing
alone and when considered with other evidence, UDOT filed a
Motion to Strike the Exhibits with the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah on February 24, 1987, and as grounds for the
Motion UDOT claimed they had never been received in evidence.
After submitting briefs and affidavits, this Court remanded
the matter to Judge Hyde for the purpose of determining whether
the judge in fact received the Exhibits in question in evidence,
and, if so, whether the judge had them before him for the purpose of making his decision.
A hearing on Remand was held before Judge Hyde on May 22,
1987, and it developed that all three Exhibits had been used by
defendant UDOT during the course of trial without objection by
plaintiffs, that at the conclusion of the trial the Exhibits
were received in evidence with the concurrence of both counsel,
and that Judge Hyde did not have them during the time he had
-11-

the case under advisement from August 27, 1986 to September 5,
1986-- 9 days. The Clerk1s Exhibit Sheet

(Addendum I) clearly

reflects that all three Exhibits were both offered and received.
Excerpts from the proceedings before Judge Hyde on Remand
follow:
THE COURT: Itfs not uncommon for my Clerk to go over with
Counsel and determine which ones were meant to be
admitted and which ones were skipped.
MR. WARD:

There is no OK there.

MR. FULLER: Well I donft know what the OK means, but it
says they are offered and it says they are received.
(R. 581 )
THE CLERK:
14, 15 and 16, they were offered and received.
I had them at one time, and when I gathered everything up for the Judge, they were gone. The OK is not
there. The OK means that the exhibits were in. They
should have been in. Somebody walked off with 14, 15
and 16. I walked into the Judge and said, I've got
exhibits missing, they walked out with them.
MR. FULLER:

So this is what the OK refers to?

THE CLERK:
The OK means the exhibits were all there for the
Judge, that they were there and together. Somebody
walked out with the Defendant!s 14, 15 and 16, and the
Judge was told that. They were not there for him to use
because an attorney walked out the door with them.
MR. WARD:

Well, that was me,...

(R. 583 )
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Both sides submitted to Judge Hyde their proposed
documents of Ruling on Order of Remand. Plaintiffs submitted
a

ff

Yes11 to the question of whether the three Exhibits were

received in evidence, but a "No" to the question of whether
Judge Hyde had the Exhibits before him for the purpose of
making his decision. On the other hand, counsel for UDOT
prepared a Ruling on Order of Remand, which Judge Hyde signed,
giving a qualified "Yes11 response to both portions of the
questions submitted by this Court.
Judge Hyde stated that he looked at the disputed Exhibits
with the following comments made during the Remand hearing :
THE COURT: Well, if they were utilized during the
questioning of witnesses, I certainly
looked at them.

(R. 582 )
THE COURT: They were not taken into chambers. I
recall seeing them. I can remember them to
that extent.

(R. 585 )
As a matter of fact, Judge Hyde only saw the field notes
of the U.S. Survey for each of the three years involved since
those Exhibits

(P-15, P-16 and P-17) were offered as

Exhibits by plaintiffs in the regular manner and they were
received in open court by him. Conversely, Counsel for UDOT
had Exhibits D-14, D-15 and D-16 numbered and marked in advance
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by the Clerk with numerous other

proposed Exhibits. Counsel for

UDOT used the disputed Exhibits in the interrogation of his
witness, John Reeve. Since those Exhibits were a part of the
official U.S. Survey from which the field notes were taken, and
would have been subsequently offered by plaintiffs, there was no
objection by plaintiffs to the use of those Exhibits in the interrogation of Mr. Reeve during the course of UDOTfs presentation of
its case. However, since those three Exhibits were not offered in
open court by Mr. Ward, and handed up to the Judge for his inspection as is customary procedure, Judge Hyde actually never saw the
three Exhibits. The transcript of the testimony of witness John
Reeve, on direct examination by Mr. Ward, is devoid of any indication that Judge Hyde saw, or likely would have seen, the three
Exhibits; he only saw Exhibits P-15, P-16 and P-17

(field notes taken

as part of the official U.S. surveys) and other Exhibits (R. 625626) prepared from the field notes.
What is abundantly clear, however, is that, during the course
of the nine days during which Judge Hyde had the case under
advisement, he did not have access to Exhibits D-14, D-15 and D-16.
THE COURT: Let the Supreme Court decide. My record
shows that they were offered and admitted, but
not utilized in chambers. Thatfs what her minute
sheet shows and she is very careful about her
minutes.

(R. 585 )
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Exhibits D-14, D-15 and D-16 are important to the
decision in this action because they show the location of the
Weber River drawn across the SW% of Section 25, and the
relation of the location of the subject property to the
entire river flow and point

out the fact that the subject

property was in Davis County in 1866.
Inasmuch as Judge Hyde in his Memorandum Decision and
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law indicated that
he was persuaded in making his decision by the fact that
there had not been a prior survey of the river, a careful
inspection of the three Exhibits would hardly support the
following statement excerpted from Judge Hyde's Memorandum
Decision:
There being no prior surveys of the river itself,
to place the river in a location other than the
1894 survey is just speculation.
(See prior Brief of PlaintiffsAddendum III-- and R. 488)
If the legislature of the Territory of Utah had felt that
the line between the two counties should have been established
by a metes-and-bounds survey, it could have done so, particularly since the area had been surveyed as early as 1855. In
any event, the law is very clear that the channel of the Weber
River is a suitable legal description, such descriptions are

-15-

commonplace, and plaintiffs have found no law to the contrary.
Inasmuch as UDOT's counsel removed the critical Exhibits
and thus made it impossible for Judge Hyde to have had them
available in making his decision, to support the Judgment in
this matter would infringe upon the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws afforded by the Federal Civil Rights
Act (premised upon violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution) and Article I, Section VII of the Constitution
of Utah.
CONCLUSION
The subject property was on the Davis County side of the
Weber River as of January 10,1866; accordingly, the Davis County
tax sale proceedings were valid and title to the subject property
should be quieted in plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,

GLEN E. FULLER
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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